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Abstract
In many multiagent scenarios, agents distribute resources, such as time or en-
ergy, among several tasks. Having completed their tasks and generated profits,
task payoffs must be divided among the agents in some reasonable manner. Co-
operative games with overlapping coalitions (OCF games) are a recent frame-
work proposed by Chalkiadakis et al. (2010), generalizing classic cooperative
games to the case where agents may belong to more than one coalition. Having
formed overlapping coalitions and divided profits, some agents may feel dissat-
isfied with their share of the profits, and would like to deviate from the given
outcome. However, deviation in OCF games is a complicated matter: agents
may decide to withdraw only some of their weight from some of the coalitions
they belong to; that is, even after deviation, it is possible that agents will still
be involved in tasks with non-deviators. This means that the desirability of a
deviation, and the stability of formed coalitions, is to a great extent determined
by the reaction of non-deviators. In this work, we explore algorithmic aspects
of OCF games, focusing on the core in OCF games. We study the problem of
deciding if the core of an OCF game is not empty, and whether a core payoff
division can be found in polynomial time; moreover, we identify conditions that
ensure that the problem admits polynomial time algorithms. Finally, we intro-
duce and study a natural class of OCF games, the Linear Bottleneck Games.
Interestingly, we show that such games always have a non-empty core, even
assuming a highly lenient reaction to deviations.
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1. Introduction
Consider a simple market exchange between several vendors, each owning a
single, divisible good. Vendors perform pairwise exchanges (say, oil for sugar)
and may charge different prices to different buyers. Suppose that having agreed
on a transaction schedule and payments, one vendor decides that he is unhappy
with the amount of money he receives from the transaction with buyer 1, and
wishes to cancel the deal. However, buyer 2, upon hearing that the transaction
with buyer 1 has been canceled, no longer wishes to work with the seller, and
cancels the agreement with him as well.
This setting features several interesting characteristics. First, a vendor may
allocate resources to several buyers, and may also buy from several vendors. In
other words, vendors may allocate resources to several profit-generating tasks.
Second, agents may withdraw some of their resources from some agreements.
For example, an oil vendor may wish to sell less oil to some client, but not
change his interactions with other parties; similarly, a vendor may want to pay
less to some sellers, but maintain the same payments to others. Finally, when
trying to strategically change an agreement, vendors must be aware of how their
actions affect the contracts they still maintain with other (possibly unaffected)
parties.
In this setting, agents must collaborate (exchange goods) in order to generate
revenue. Having generated revenue by making an exchange, agents are free to
share the profits of the exchange as they see fit. Profit sharing can be done
directly, if the exchange of goods results in profit, e.g., if the agents can produce
a new good using their resources and sell it for a profit; it can also be indirect,
e.g., via setting a price for the good sold. To conclude, agents must first work
together to generate profits, and, subsequently, share profits among themselves
in some reasonable manner. When sharing profits, agents should account for
individuals or groups of agents who are underpaid. A group of agents who can
get more money by deviating from the proposed agreement may destabilize the
entire market, resulting in a cascade of deviations that may result in a less
desirable state (not to mention the cost of actual deviations). However, what
constitutes a profitable deviation greatly depends on how non-deviators respond
to a deviating set.
Modeling this system of incentives and reactions is a challenge in itself,
which has only recently been addressed. In their paper, Chalkiadakis et al.
(2010) propose a novel approach to modeling scenarios where agents can di-
vide resources among several coalitions, called overlapping coalition formation
games (OCF games). Following their work, Zick et al. (2014) propose a general
model for handling deviations in such settings. These two works offer a rather
comprehensive conceptual model for handling deviation behavior and analyzing
stability in settings where agents work on several concurrent projects, and may
only partially deviate.
While conceptual models of strategic interactions in OCF games have been
developed to a rather satisfactory degree, there has been little work on comput-
ing solution concepts for such games. The theory of OCF games is a generaliza-
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tion of classic cooperative game theory (Peleg and Sudho¨lter, 2007), where com-
putational issues are relatively well-understood (see Chalkiadakis et al. (2011)
for an overview). However, as Chalkiadakis et al. (2010) show, more elaborate
reactions to deviation may make even tractable instances of computing solution
concepts for classic cooperative games NP-hard. For example, Chalkiadakis et al.
(2010) consider a class of games called threshold task games, a class generalizing
weighted voting games). It is shown that finding a payoff division in the core can
be done in pseudo-polynomial time (i.e., in time polynomial in the number of
agents and in the number of bits used to encode the largest weight of any agent),
if one assumes that when a set of agents deviates, no other agent will want to
work with it—a reaction termed conservative. However, if non-deviators agree
to work with a deviating set in any coalition that is unhurt by the deviation, a
reaction termed refined, the same problem becomes NP-hard.
To conclude, when assessing the computational complexity of finding stable
outcomes in OCF games, one needs to consider not only structural properties of
the value function (i.e., the way that agents generate profits), but also the way
agents react to deviations. In our work, we study some of the computational
issues that arise from these two aspects of OCF games, when deciding stability
related questions in OCF games.
1.1. Our Contribution
In this work we study several closely related questions:
1. Given an OCF game, find an optimal coalition structure—i.e., an optimal
way for agents to divide into groups and generate profits.
2. Given an OCF game, a coalition structure, a payoff division and a subset
of agents, compute the most that these agents can get by deviating.
3. Given an OCF game, a coalition structure and a payoff division, decide
whether the given payoff division is stable, i.e, does there exist a subset of
agents that can receive more by deviating, given the reaction non-deviators
would have to the deviation?
4. Given an OCF game, find a stable outcome if one exists—i.e., find a
coalition structure and a payoff division that ensures that no subset of
agents can deviate, again given the reaction of the rest of the agents to
the deviation.
Our paper makes two attempts to answer these questions. In the first part of
this paper (sections 3 to 6), we make no assumptions on how agents generate
revenue (i.e., the characteristic function can take any form), and focus instead
on the structure of their interaction. In Section 3, we show that in order to
circumvent computational intractability, several conditions must be met. First,
given the results of Chalkiadakis et al. (2010), we search for pseudopolynomial
time algorithms that decide the above questions (foregoing this assumption re-
sults in NP-hardness, even for a single agent). Second, agents cannot form large
coalitions; third, as shown in Section 4, agent reaction to deviators must also
be limited in its scope, as complex reactions to deviation are a source of com-
putational complexity in themselves. Inspired by the work of Demange (2004),
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we study settings where agent interactions have a tree structure. Under these
assumptions, optimal coalition structures and profitable deviations can be found
(as shown in Sections 3 and 4); moreover, deciding whether a payoff division is
stable and whether the core is not empty can be done in polynomial time (see
Section 5).
In order to provide a clearer picture of the role of interaction structure in lim-
iting computational complexity, we provide a connection between the treewidth
of the agent interaction graph, a graph whose edges correspond to allowable
agent interactions, and the computational complexity of finding stable outcomes
in OCF games. In Section 6, we show how the algorithms described in previous
sections can be extended to algorithms whose running time is polynomial in n
and (WM )
k, where n is the number of agents,WM is the maximal weight of any
agent, and k is the treewidth of the interaction graph.
In the second part of our paper (Section 7), we make no assumptions on the
structure of agent interactions, but rather limit our attention to a specific class
of OCF games. That is, instead of limiting how agents interact, we limit the
way in which they generate profits. More specifically, we study a class of games
we term linear bottleneck games (LBGs); our main insight is that these games
are stable even if one assumes a very lenient reaction to deviation. Our results
extend those of Markakis and Saberi (2005), who show that a subclass of these
games (namely, multicommodity flow games) is stable in the classic cooperative
sense.
2. Preliminaries
In what follows, we refer to sets using uppercase letters, and to vectors in
boldface letters. Given two vectors x,y ∈ Rm, we say that x ≤ y if for all
j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, we have that xi ≤ yi. Given a set of agents S ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and
a vector x ∈ Rm we denote by xS the vector that equals x on all coordinates
i ∈ S, and is 0 elsewhere. For a set S ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and a vector x ∈ Rn, we
write x(S) =
∑
i∈S x
i. Finally, we let eS be the indicator vector of S in Rn:
the i-th coordinate of eS is 1 if i ∈ S, and is 0 otherwise.
We begin by recalling the definition of a classic cooperative game (Peleg and Sudho¨lter,
2007). A cooperative game G is a tuple 〈N, u〉, where N = {1, . . . , n} is a set of
agents, and u : 2N → R+ is a function that assigns a value to every subset of
agents S ⊆ N . Every subset S ⊆ N , will also be referred to as a coalition. A
coalition structure is a partition of agents Π = {S1, . . . , Sm} into disjoint sub-
sets; that is, for all Sj, Sj′ ∈ Π, Sj ∩ Sj′ = ∅, and
⋃m
j=1 Sj = N . An imputation
for Π is a vector p = (p1, . . . , pn) that satisfies individual rationality: pi ≥ u({i})
for all i ∈ N , and coalitional efficiency: for all Sj ∈ Π, p(Sj) = u(Sj). In words,
an imputation is a division of the payoffs generated by the agents forming Π
such that agents are individually incentivized to form a coalition structure, and
that the payoff from forming a coalition Sj is allocated only to the members of
Sj . We observe that when forming a coalition structure, agents may not join
more than one coalition. While this is a valid assumption in many multi-agent
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scenarios, it is often the case that agents split their resources among several
projects, forming overlapping coalitions.
In what follows, we describe discrete overlapping coalition formation (OCF)
games, a variant of overlapping coalition formation (OCF) games (Chalkiadakis et al.,
2010). A discrete OCF game is a tuple G = 〈N,W, v〉. The set N is the set
of agents as before; each agent i ∈ N has a weight Wi, and these weights are
collectively described by the vector W = (W1, . . . ,Wn).
One can think of Wi as the amount of some resource that agent i possesses.
We write W = {c ∈ Zn+ | c ≤ W}, which is simply the set {0, . . . ,W1} ×
· · · × {0, . . . ,Wn}; the set W is the set of all possible ways in which agents can
allocate resources to a single task. The characteristic function v : W → R+
receives as input a vector c ∈ W , and outputs a value v(c), describing the
profit generated by the agents in N . In order to generate profits, each agent
must decide how much of his resources will he contribute to a certain task; the
contribution of agent i is simply a number ci ∈ {0, . . . ,Wi}, where if ci = 0
then agent i contributes nothing to completing a task, and if ci = Wi then all
of agent i’s resources are assigned to a task. A vector c ∈ W is also called a
coalition; ci refers to the contribution of agent i, and the value v(c) is the total
profit derived when agents contribute according to c. Given a coalition c ∈ W ,
we define the support of c to be the set of all agents in N that contribute some
of their resources to c. Formally, we write supp(c) = {i ∈ N | ci > 0}. Agents
in supp(c) are those agents that have some vested interest in c: they are the
only ones who may receive a share of the profits made by c, and will potentially
be affected by any changes to c.
Remark 2.1. In some departure from Chalkiadakis et al. (2010) and Zick and Elkind
(2011), we focus on algorithmic aspects of finding stable payoff divisions in OCF
games. In the general OCF setting, agents are not limited to integer contribu-
tions to coalitions, and may contribute any fraction of their resources to a coali-
tion. The generality of the “classic” OCF setting, however, introduces certain
conceptual concerns—e.g., it allows agents to form an arbitrarily large number
of different coalitions. Thus, it is unclear how to represent the characteristic
function in a general OCF game, as one must, in principle, be able to provide a
value for infinitely many possible coalitions.
All definitions given here are discrete equivalents of the definitions given for
arbitrated OCF games in (Zick and Elkind, 2011); in fact, the definitions given
here can be used nearly verbatim to define non-discrete OCF games. Indeed, if
one defines a coalition as a vector c ∈ [0, 1]n and agent resources as values in
[0, 1] then the classic OCF game definition is obtained, since in that definition a
coalition is a vector c ∈ [0, 1]n, with the contribution value ci representing the
fraction of resources that agent i allocates to the coalition c.
It is often the case that in order to maximize their profits, agents would
be interested in forming more than one coalition, and participate in a coalition
structure. A coalition structure, CS , is a finite list of coalitions, i.e., CS =
(c1, . . . , cm); we let |CS | be the number of coalitions in CS . Note that CS is a
list (a multiset), rather than a set of coalitions; this is because it is possible that
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some coalitions may form more than once, having agents completing the same
task several times. We use standard set notation to refer to elements of CS .
That is, if y ∈ CS , then y is one of the coalitions listed in CS ; if CS ′ ⊆ CS ,
then CS ′ is a list of coalitions that are all listed in CS . Since no agent can
contribute more than the total amount of resources he possesses, we require
that
∑
c∈CS c
i ≤ Wi for all i ∈ N . We overload notation and write v(CS ) in
order to refer to
∑
c∈CS v(c). Given a subset S ⊆ N , we denote by CS(S) the
set of all coalition structures that can be formed by members of S; that is, CS(S)
consists of all coalition structures CS , such that for all c ∈ CS , supp(c) ⊆ S.
For S = N , CS(N) simply refers to CS. The weight of a coalition is written as
w(CS ) =
∑
c∈CS c. We say that CS is efficient if all agents in S contribute all
of their resources to CS , that is, w(CS ) =WS .
Given a coalition structure CS ∈ CS and a set S ⊆ N , the coalition structure
CS reduced to S, CS |S , is defined to be (w ∈ CS | supp(w) ⊆ S). The coalition
structure CS |S lists all coalitions in CS that are fully controlled by the members
of S; if S decides to deviate, the resources used in CS |S are freely available to
S, but any coalition w ∈ CS \CS |S contains non-S members as well, hence any
changes to such coalitions may lead to negative repercussions for S, should it
choose to change its contribution to w.
Given a game G = 〈N,W, v〉, we define the superadditive cover of v to be
the function v∗ :W → R+, such that for all c ∈ W
v∗(c) = max{v(CS ) | w(CS ) = c}.
Simply put, v∗(c) is the maximal profit that agents can generate by forming
coalitions when their total resources are given by c. We note that in our model,
for any c ∈ W there always exists a coalition structure CS ∈ CS such that
w(CS ) = c, and v∗(c) = v(CS ).
Finally, we observe that if Wi = 1 for all i ∈ N , the resulting game is a
classic cooperative game with coalition structures (Aumann and Dre`ze, 1974).
2.1. Payoff Division
Having formed a coalition structure, agents will then have to divide the
profits generated by the coalitions formed. Given a coalition structure CS =
(c1, . . . , cm), an imputation x = (x1, . . . ,xm) is a list of |CS | = m vectors in Rn+.
The vector xj describes the way the profits from the coalition cj are divided
among the agents. Given a coalition c ∈ CS , and an imputation x, we refer to
the division of the profits from c as x(c); the payoff to agent i from c is xi(c).
Such profit divisions must satisfy the following rules:
Coalitional efficiency: for all c ∈ CS , the total payoff from x(c) must equal
v(c); that is,
∑n
i=1 x
i(c) = v(c).
No side payments: for all c ∈ CS , if i /∈ supp(c), then xi(c) = 0. This
condition simply means that agents that did not contribute any resources
to the coalition c may not partake in the profits generated by c.
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Individual rationality: for all i ∈ N , the total payoff to i must exceed the
most that i can get by working alone, or v∗(Wi). Formally:
∑
c∈CS x
i(c) ≥
v∗(ei) for all i ∈ N .
The set of all possible imputations for a coalition structure CS is denoted by
I(CS ); an outcome is a pair (CS ,x), where CS is a coalition structure and x is in
I(CS ). We also define pi(CS ,x) to be the total payoff to agent i under (CS ,x):
pi(CS ,x) =
∑m
c∈CS x
i(c); given some set S ⊆ N , we similarly define pS(CS ,x)
to be the total payoff to the set S under (CS ,x): pS(CS ,x) =
∑
i∈S pi(CS ,x).
Note that our definition of an outcome in OCF games is a generalization of the
notion of an outcome in classic cooperative games, where an outcome consists
of a coalition structure Π = {S1, . . . , Sm}, and an imputation p for Π.
2.2. Deviation and Arbitration Functions
In a classic cooperative game G = 〈N, u〉, a subset of agents deviates from
an outcome (Π,p) when its total payoff p(S) is less than the profits it can gen-
erate on its own, u(S). However, in OCF games, deviation is a much more
complicated matter. The classic notion of deviation in cooperative games im-
plicitly assumes that when a set of agents deviates, it may not retain any ties
to non-deviators; that is, it measures the desirability of deviation against the
most it can make on its own, and assumes that non-deviators will no longer
collaborate with a deviating set. This is not necessarily the case in the OCF
setting: when a set S ⊆ N deviates from an outcome (CS ,x), it may still retain
some resources in coalitions with agents in N \ S. Deciding whether to retain
connections with non-deviators requires that S has prior knowledge of the way
non-deviators react to deviations. In other words, in order to assess the desir-
ability of a deviation, S must know how the non-members of S will react to
such a move. Chalkiadakis et al. (2010) were the first to point out this type of
agent behavior, and have shown how different types of non-deviator reactions
to deviation lead to different notions of stability. Zick and Elkind (2011) sug-
gest a general framework for handling deviation in OCF games, which is termed
arbitration functions.
We begin by formally defining a deviation in OCF games. Given an outcome
(CS ,x) and an agent set S, a deviation of S from (CS ,x) is a coalition structure
CS ′ whose coalitions describe the resources that S withdraws from each coalition
c ∈ CS \CS |S . We let dCS ′(c) denote the coalition in CS
′ which describes the
resources that S withdraws from the coalition c, omitting the CS ′ subscript
when it is understood from context. Given a deviation CS ′, we require that
d(c) satisfies d(c) ≤ c, and d(c) ≤ eS ; the first requirement ensures that no
agent in S withdraws more resources than it has invested in c, while the second
requirement ensures that agents that do not belong to S do not withdraw any
resources from c. Note that the formal definition of deviation does not refer to
the imputation x in any explicit manner.
Having withdrawn resources from the coalition structure CS , non-deviating
agents —the members of N \ S— must decide how they react to the devia-
tion. Formally, Zick and Elkind (2011) define the arbitration function A to be
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a function whose input is an outcome (CS ,x), a deviating set S ⊆ N , and
a deviation CS ′ of S from CS . For each c ∈ CS \ CS |S , A outputs a value
αc(CS ,x, S,CS
′), which specifies the total payoff that the coalition c offers S
as a result of its deviation. In order for a deviation to be profitable, members
of S must first form a coalition structure using all resources available to them,
divide the payoffs from that coalition structure, and divide the (possibly nega-
tive) payoffs from αc such that every agent in S receives a strictly higher payoff
than what he receives under (CS ,x). If this is possible, we say that CS ′ is an
A-profitable deviation of S from (CS ,x). An outcome (CS ,x) is called A-stable
if no subset S ⊆ N can A-profitably deviate from (CS ,x), and similarly, a
game G is A-stable if there exists an outcome (CS ,x) that is A-stable. Suppose
that S forms the coalition structure CS ′′ with the resources it has withdrawn
from CS (and possibly with other unused resources from S); the total payoff
that S receives from the deviation CS ′ under A, if it forms CS ′′, is written as
A(CS ,x, S,CS ′) = v(CS ′′) +
∑
c∈CS\CS |S
αc(CS ,x, S,CS
′); the most that S
can get by deviating is denoted
A∗(CS ,x, S) = sup{A(CS ,x, S,CS ′) | CS ′ is a deviation of S from (CS ,x)}.
Zick and Elkind (2011) provide a simple characterization of A-stable games,
given in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.2 (Zick and Elkind (2011)). An OCF game G = 〈N, v〉 is A-stable
if and only if there exists an outcome (CS ,x) such that for all S ⊆ N ,
pS(CS ,x) ≥ A
∗(CS ,x, S).
Theorem 2.2 implies that, to verify stability, there is no need to look for
explicit deviations and check if all deviators are strictly better off. Instead, it
is enough to simply ensure that the total payoff to S is greater than the total
payoff S can receive by deviating—no matter how it deviates.
Before we proceed, let us describe some arbitration functions, which will also
be the focus of this paper.1
The Conservative Arbitration Function: under this function, denoted Ac,
deviators receive nothing from non-deviators. Hence, αc ≡ 0 for any
deviation. When reasoning about the desirability of a deviation under
Ac, S has no incentive to retain any of its resources in coalitions with
non-deviators: it will not be paid from those coalitions.
The Sensitive Arbitration Function: rather than assuming that agents will
refuse outright to cooperate with deviators, one can take a slightly more
“lenient” approach. Under the sensitive arbitration function, denoted As,
1All arbitration functions mentioned here were introduced by Chalkiadakis et al. (2010);
however, Chalkiadakis et al. (2010) do not use the term arbitration functions to describe agent
reaction to deviation. The term is later introduced in Zick and Elkind (2011).
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if a coalition c is changed by the deviation of S, then all agents in supp(c)
refuse to cooperate with the agents in S in other coalitions. However, if
none of the agents in a (possibly different) coalition c′ were affected by
the deviation, S is still allowed to retain (all of) its original payoffs from
c′ under (CS ,x).
The Refined Arbitration Function: the refined arbitration function, denoted
Ar assumes an even more lenient approach to deviation. Under Ar, if a
coalition c is unchanged by a deviation of a set S, S is allowed to keep
(all of) its original payoffs from c under (CS ,x).
The Optimistic Arbitration Function: finally, agents may be highly agree-
able to changes in their coalitions. Suppose that the deviation of a set
S from a coalition c ∈ CS \ CS |S is d(c); after S deviates, the value of
c is reduced to v(c − d(c)). Under Ao, the payoff to S from c is simply
v(c − d(c)) −
∑
i∈N\S x(c)
i; that is, if S wants to receive payoff from c,
it must pay the cost of it withdrawing resources from c, and ensure that
agents in N \ S can still retain their original payoffs.
The following example highlights the reasoning behind some of the arbitration
functions presented above.
Example 2.3. Suppose that the current coalition structure contains three coali-
tions, c1, c2 and c12, in addition to several other coalitions. We have that
supp(c1) = {1, 3}, supp(c2) = {2, 3} and supp(c12) = {1, 2, 3}. That is, c1 is a
coalition in which agents 1 and 3 collaborate, in c2 agents 2 and 3 collaborate,
and in c12 agents 1, 2 and 3 work together. Now, suppose that agent 3 wishes to
withdraw his resources from the coalition c1. Under the conservative arbitration
function, agent 3 will not be paid from neither c2 nor c12; under the sensitive
arbitration function, agent 3 can only expect payoff from c2: since he changed
c1 —a coalition containing an agent in the support of c12— he cannot expect
to receive any payoffs from c12. Under the refined arbitration function, both c2
and c12 will allow agent 3 to retain any payoffs it received from them, as they
were unaffected by the deviation.
We observe that the amount that the coalition c needs to pay a deviating set
can be determined by the effects that S has on other coalitions. For example,
under the sensitive arbitration function, c may choose not to pay S, despite the
fact that c was not affected at all by the deviation.
3. Finding an Optimal Coalition Structure
We now begin our formal computational analysis of OCF games, starting
with the fundamental problem of finding optimal coalition structures. We as-
sume that the reader is familiar with standard notions of computational com-
plexity and complexity classes (see Garey and Johnson (1979) for an overview).
We begin by describing the formal computational model that we study in this
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work. Given a discrete OCF game G = 〈N,W, v〉, we assume that the value
v(c) for all c ∈ W is computable in polynomial time. Moreover, we assume that
the arbitration function can be computed in polynomial time for all inputs. In
other words, we assume that we have oracle access to both v and A. This as-
sumption does not trivially hold—a naive representation of the function v is
a list of |W| =
∏n
i=1(Wi + 1) values, one for each possible coalition that the
agents may form; since Wi ≥ 1 for all i ∈ N , it follows that |W| ≥ 2n, i.e., it is
exponential in the natural problem parameters.
Studying games with a succinct representation, be it OCF or non-OCF
games, is an interesting problem in its own right. In our work, we do not
discuss representation issues in OCF games, except Section 7, where we focus
on the so-called linear bottleneck games. Instead, rather than focusing on a
particular succinct representation, we make the following simplifying assump-
tion: the agents cannot form arbitrarily large coalitions—i.e., each coalition size
is bounded by a constant. Formally, we capture this notion in the following
definition.
Definition 3.1 (k-OCF Games). An OCF game G = 〈N,W, v〉 is a k-OCF
game if, for all c ∈ W , if |supp(c)| > k then v(c) = 0.
Definition 3.1 applies to several real-life scenarios where overlapping coali-
tions form. In many market scenarios, transactions are performed involving only
few parties; in social network applications, agents form pairwise coalitions; in
many large-scale collaborative projects, small teams are formed to tackle various
aspects, as large teams of collaborators tend to be less efficient. In order to sim-
plify notation, given a set of agents i1, . . . , ik, let us write vi1,...,ik(wi1 , . . . , wik )
to denote the value of v when agent i1 contributes wi1 , agent i2 contributes wi2
and so on. For example, vi,j(wi, wj) is the value of agents i and j collaborating,
where agent i contributes wi and agent j contributes wj . We note that the
number of coalitions that can have a positive value in k-OCF games is
(
n
k
)
W kM ,
so if k is a constant, then the characteristic function for a k-OCF game can be
represented by a polynomial number of bits.
3.1. Finding an optimal coalition structure
The problem of “finding an optimal coalition structure” in an OCF setting
can be rephrased as follows. Given a k-OCF game G = 〈N,W, v〉, we are
interested in the following question: is the maximal (“optimal”) profit that
agents expect to (collectively) accumulate by forming an overlapping coalition
structure greater than a given value?
Definition 3.2 (OptVal). An instance of the OptVal problem is given by a
discrete OCF game G = 〈N,W, v〉, a coalition c ∈ W and a value V ∈ Q, and
is denoted by OptVal(G, c, V ). It is a “yes” instance if and only if v∗(c) ≥ V .
Letting WM = maxi∈N Wi, the following simple proposition is an important
first step in computing solutions for OCF games.
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Proposition 3.3. Given an OCF game G, a coalition c, and a parameter V , if
|supp(c)| = m, then OptVal(G, c, V ) is decidable in time polynomial in (WM +
1)m.
Proof. We observe that
v∗(c) = max {v(c), {v∗(c− d) + v(d) | d ≤ c;d 6= c}} .
Observe that the number of coalitions d such that d ≤ c is at most (WM +1)m,
so computing v∗(c) requires computing at most (WM +1)
m values of v∗, which
require a comparison of at most (WM + 1)
m values each, for a total running
time that is polynomial in (WM + 1)
m.
Proposition 3.3 implies that if |supp(c)| is a constant, and WM is polyno-
mial in n, thenOptVal(G, c, V ) can be computed in time polynomial in n. This
result is the best one can hope for: Chalkiadakis et al. (2010) show via a reduc-
tion from the Knapsack problem (Garey and Johnson, 1979), that when agent
weights are large, OptVal is NP-complete. We now turn to study OptVal
when the group of agents involved is large—i.e., |supp(c)| is not a constant. We
stress that when |supp(c)| is not a constant, this simply means that a large group
of agents wants to form a coalition structure. The coalition sizes in the coalition
structure will still be small in our setting. Proposition 3.3 was concerned with a
small number of agents wanting to find the best way to share resources among
themselves; when the number of agents is not small, the actual coalitions that
they form may still be. For example, if |supp(c)| = 100, this means that there
are 100 agents whose available resources are given by c. Suppose that the agents
may only conduct pairwise interactions; in that case, agents simply wish to find
the best way for them to form smaller coalitions using the resources available
as per c.
We begin by showing the following negative result.
Proposition 3.4. OptVal is NP-complete even if one assumes that G is a
2-OCF game, and that WM = 3.
Proof. First, we observe that OptVal is in NP; it suffices to guess a coalition
structure CS such that w(CS ) = c and check whether v(CS ) ≥ V ; note that
the size of this coalition structure is at most nWM , which is polynomial in the
input size, assuming that WM is polynomial in n.
For the hardness proof, we provide a reduction from Exact Cover by 3-
Sets (X3C), Garey and Johnson (1979). Recall that an instance X = 〈A,S, ℓ〉
of X3C is given by a finite set A, |A| = 3ℓ, and a collection of subsets S =
{S1, . . . , St} such that Sj ⊆ A and |Sj| = 3 for all j = 1, . . . , t. It is a “yes”-
instance if A can be exactly covered by sets from S; that is, if there exists a
subset S ′ ⊆ S such that
⋃
S∈S′ S = A, and for any two S, T ∈ S
′ we have
S ∩ T = ∅.
Given an instance X = 〈A,S〉 of X3C, we construct a discrete 2-OCF game
G(X ) = 〈N, v〉 with WM = 3, as follows. We have an agent ai of weight 1
for every element i ∈ A and an agent aS with weight 3 for every S ∈ S. The
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characteristic function is defined as follows: if i ∈ S, then the value of both ai
and aS forming a coalition where each of them contributes a weight of 1 is 2;
that is, if supp(c) = {ai, aS} and agent contributions are cai = caS = 1, then
v(c) = 2. Moreover, agents corresponding to sets in S can generate profits by
working alone: if they dedicate all their weight to forming a singleton coalition,
they generate a profit of 5. In other words, if supp(c) = {aS} and caS = 3 then
v(c) = 5. The value of every other partial coalition in the game G(X ) is 0.
Let S ∈ S be {x, y, z}, and consider the set of agents GS = {aS, ax, ay, az}.
Collectively, the agents in GS can earn 6 if aS forms a partial coalition with each
of ax, ay, and az, and contributes one unit of weight to each of these coalitions;
in any other coalition structure, GS earns at most 5. Hence, X = 〈A,S〉 admits
an exact cover if and only if v∗(W) ≥ 6 |A|3 + 5(t −
|A|
3 ) = 5t +
|A|
3 . Let V be
this value.
To see the correctness of our reduction, suppose that X is a “yes” instance
of X3C. Then there exists some S ′ ⊆ S of size |A|3 that exactly covers A. In
that case,
v∗(W) ≥
∑
S∈S′
v∗(WGS ) +
∑
S/∈S′
v∗(WGS ) = 6
|A|
3
+ 5(t−
|A|
3
) = V.
On the other hand, suppose that v∗(W) ≥ 6 |A|3 + 5(t−
|A|
3 ). Then this means
that there is a subset of S, S ′, of size at least |A|3 such that for all S ∈ S
′ we have
that v∗(WGS ) = 6. Note that since |S| = 3 for all S ∈ S ′ and since S ∩ T = ∅
for all S, T ∈ S ′, it must be that |S ′| = |A|3 , i.e., S
′ is a partition of A; thus, S ′
is indeed an exact cover of A.
Proposition 3.4 severely limits our prospects of computing optimal coali-
tion structures: even if agents are limited to pairwise interactions, and agent
weights are small constants, OptVal remains hard. Observe that the hardness
of OptVal implies the hardness of most other problems of interest in our work:
the most that a set can gain by deviating, the stability of a given game, and
the possibility of deviation from a given outcome of a game. Thus, in order
to proceed, we must first identify some limiting conditions that make OptVal
computationally tractable.
3.2. Limiting Interactions in OCF Games
Demange (2004) shows that if one assumes a hierarchical agent interaction
structure in a cooperative game, then the core of the game is not empty; more-
over, it is possible to find a core imputation in polynomial time. We now show
how to adapt this interesting result to the OCF setting. The formal model
we propose is not unlike the one presented by Demange. An agent interaction
graph is a graph Γ = 〈N,E〉, where the edges in E represent valid agent inter-
actions; given an OCF game G = 〈N,W, v〉, the game G reduced to Γ, denoted
G|Γ = 〈N, v|Γ〉 is defined as follows: for every c ∈ W , if the nodes in supp(c)
induce a connected subgraph in Γ then v|Γ(c) = v(c), otherwise v|Γ(c) = 0.
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Such graph restrictions on agent interaction are known in classic cooperative
game theory as Myerson graphs (Myerson, 1977). Unfortunately, limiting agent
interaction is not a sufficient condition for the tractability of OptVal. As
shown in Chalkiadakis et al. (2010), finding an optimal coalition structure is
hard, even for a single agent, if his weight is sufficiently large. Moreover, even
if weights are small but one does not limit the size of allowable coalitions, as-
suming that agents interact based on a hierarchical tree structure does not aid
computational complexity, as shown by the following proposition.
Proposition 3.5. OptVal is NP-hard, even for the family of instances (G|T , c, V )
where T is a tree and agent weights are constant.
Proof. Our reduction is from the Independent-Set problem (Garey and Johnson,
1979). An instance of Independent-Set is a tuple 〈Γ,m〉, where Γ = 〈N,E〉
is a graph and m is an integer. It is a “yes” instance if Γ contains an inde-
pendent set of size at least m, and is a “no” instance otherwise. Recall that
an independent set in Γ is a subset of vertices S ⊆ N such that if i, j ∈ S,
then the edge {i, j} is not in E. In other words, it is a subset of vertices that
do not share an edge with one another. Given an instance 〈Γ = 〈N,E〉,m〉 of
Independent-Set, we construct the following instance of OptVal: we set the
player set to be N ′ = N ∪{n+1}, and have the interaction graph T connect all
vertices in N with n + 1 via an edge. We set all agents in N to have a weight
of 1, whereas agent n + 1 has a weight of 2. The characteristic function v is
defined as follows: given a set S ⊆ N , if it is an independent set in Γ, and player
n+ 1 allocates a weight of 1 to working with S, then the value of the resulting
coalition is 1. If S forms a vertex cover of Γ (i.e., all vertices in Γ share an edge
with the vertices in S), then the value of the resulting coalition is ε|S|+1 , where
ε is some constant much smaller than 1. In order to form an optimal coalition
structure, n + 1 must allocate a weight of 1 to the maximal independent set,
and a weight of 1 to working with the rest of the vertices. This is because if S
is an independent set, then N \ S is a vertex cover. We conclude that the value
of the optimal coalition structure in the resulting game is more than 1+ εn−m+1
if and only if there exists an independent set of size at least m.
We note that Proposition 3.5 does not hold for classic cooperative games:
this would be a contradiction to Demange’s theorem. However, it is worth noting
that the game described in Proposition 3.5 is “almost” a classic cooperative
game: there is only one agent whose weight is not 1, and his weight is only 2.
Indeed, changing the weight of player n + 1 from 2 to 1 in the above theorem
would result in a game with a trivially optimal coalition structure: forming the
grand coalition N ∪ {n+ 1}.
Propositions 3.4 and 3.5 suggest the following three conditions are necessary
in order to find an optimal coalition structure in polynomial time:
1. Limiting agent weights.
2. Limiting agent interactions.
3. Limiting coalition size.
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Dropping any of these three limitations results in hard instances of OptVal.
We can, however, compute an optimal structure for games whose interaction
graphs are trees in time polynomial in WM , assuming that G is a 2-OCF game.
Given a tree T = 〈N,E〉 whose root is some r ∈ N , and a player i ∈ N , let Ti
be the subtree rooted at i, and Ci(T ) be the children of i in T . Given a graph
Γ, we refer to the nodes of Γ as N(Γ). Finally, given a coalition c ∈ W , we
write (c−i, w) to denote the coalition c with the i-th coordinate replaced by w.
For ease of exposition, we say that G has a tree interaction structure if there
exists some tree T = 〈N,E〉 such that G = G|T ; this way, T is part of the game
description, and does not have to be an additional input.
Theorem 3.6. For the family of discrete 2-OCF games with a tree interaction
structure, OptVal can be decided in time polynomial in WM and n.
Proof. Let G = 〈N,W, v〉 be a discrete 2-OCF game. We will show how to
compute v∗(W); however, our result easily holds for general c ∈ W : simply
look at the game where agent weights are as per c.
We arbitrarily choose some player r ∈ N to be the root of the interaction
graph, and process the players in N from the leaves up to the root. The key
observation to make is that in order to find an optimal allocation of the players’
resources, each node in the tree needs to decide how much weight is to be
allocated to its subtree, how much is to be allocated to collaborating with its
parent, and how much is to be allocated to working alone. Note that according
to Proposition 3.3, both v∗i (x) and v
∗
i,j(x, y) can be computed in time polynomial
in WM . Given a node i ∈ N , let Ci be the children of i in the interaction graph.
Let v∗Ti(w) be the most that the subtree Ti can make if agent i allocates w to
working with Ti. We note that
v∗Ti(w) = max
yi+
∑
c∈Ci
wc=w
∀c∈Ci:0≤xc≤Wc
{v∗i (yi) +
∑
c∈Ci
v∗i,c(wc, xc) + v
∗
Tc(Wc − xc)}.
Using this recurrence relation we obtain the following dynamic programming
method of finding an optimal coalition structure.
Suppose that we have already computed v∗Tc(w) for all c ∈ Ci and all w =
0, . . . , wc. Now, let us write Ci = {c1, . . . , cm}, and let Ti,j be the subtree Ti,
but with the subtrees Tcj+1 , . . . , Tcm removed. Let v
∗
Ti,j
(w) be the maximal
revenue that can be generated if agent i invests w in working with Ti,j . We also
write Ti,0 to be the tree Ti with all subtrees removed, i.e., the tree comprised of
the singleton {i}. Now, suppose that we have already computed v∗Ti,j′ (w) for all
j′ = 0, . . . , j − 1 and all w = 0, . . . ,Wi. In that case, we can compute v∗Ti,j (w)
in time polynomial in WM and n, as
v∗Ti,j (w) = max
x+z=w
y≤Wcj
{v∗i,cj (x, y) + v
∗
Ti,j−1 (z) + v
∗
Tcj
(Wcj − y)},
allowing us to find the value of v∗Ti,j (w) in time polynomial in WM , and v
∗
Ti
(0),
. . . , v∗Ti(Wi) in time polynomial in WM but linear in |Ci|. Going through all
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the nodes from the leaves to the root, we obtain that the value of the optimal
coalition structure is simply the value v∗Tr (Wr).
4. Computing Optimal Deviations
In Section 3 we identified three key conditions for the computational tractabil-
ity of finding an optimal coalition structure in OCF games. Before we turn to
computational aspects of stability in OCF games, let us study the problem of
deciding the most that a set can obtain by deviating from a given outcome.
Formally, we are interested in the following problem:
Definition 4.1 (ArbVal). An instance of the ArbVal problem is given by a
tuple of the form 〈G,A, S, (CS ,x), V 〉, where G = 〈N, v〉 is an OCF game, A is
some arbitration function, S is a subset of N , (CS ,x) is an outcome of G, and
V ∈ Q is some parameter. It is a “yes” instance if A∗(CS ,x, S) ≥ V , and is a
“no” instance otherwise.
We note that any hardness results obtained for OptVal are immediately
inherited by ArbVal, as the two problems are identical if one assumes that
non-deviators behave according to the conservative arbitration function—i.e.,
give zero payoffs to deviators regardless of the nature of their deviation. How-
ever, ArbVal is a considerably more complex problem than OptVal; in order
to ensure that ArbVal can be decided in polynomial time, one must make as-
sumptions not only on the structure of the game G, but also on the way that
agents react to deviation. In a sense, computational complexity can arise by
making the payment structure of A sufficiently complex. This is shown in the
following proposition.
Proposition 4.2. If there exists a polynomial time algorithm that can de-
cide ArbVal, when restricted to instances 〈G,A, S, (CS ,x), V 〉 such that G =
〈N,W, v〉 is a 2 player game, then P = NP.
Proof. We will show that if such an algorithm exists, it can be used to solve
instances of Set-Cover Garey and Johnson (1979). Recall that an instance
of Set-Cover is given by a set of elements A, a collection of subsets S =
{S1, . . . , St} ⊆ 2A and ℓ ∈ N; it is a “yes”-instance if A can be covered by at
most ℓ sets from S.
Given an instance of Set-Cover, 〈A,S, ℓ〉 such that |S| = t, consider a 2-
player discrete OCF game where w1 = w2 = t+ 2. We define v in the following
manner. First, players get a payoff of 1 for each unit of resource devoted to
working alone, i.e. v1(x) = v2(x) = x for all x ∈ {0, . . . , t + 2}. We also
set v1,2(1, 1) = 2, and v1,2(2, 2) = 10(t + 2). All other coalitions can have an
arbitrary value (we assume with no loss of generality that it is 0).
We define an outcome (CS ,x) as follows. players 1 and 2 form t coalitions
where each one of them devotes 1 unit of resources to working together, and an
additional coalition where both invest 2 units; that is, CS = (c1, . . . , ct,d), such
that cj = (1, 1) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ t, and d = (2, 2). We define x = (x1, . . . ,xt,y)
15
as follows: xj = (0, 2) is the payoff division from coalition cj , and y = (5(t +
2), 5(t+2)). In other words, we allocate the payoffs from c1, . . . , ct to player 2,
and split the payoff from d equally.
We define the arbitration function A as follows. Given that player 1 wishes
to deviate from (CS ,x), by withdrawing only from the coalitions cj1 , . . . , cjs ,
he receives no payoff from the coalitions c1, . . . , ct, and will only get to keep
his payoff from d if the collection {Sj ∈ S | j /∈ {j1, . . . , js}} is a set cover of
A. For any other input, we can define an arbitrary output for A (without loss
of generality, let us assume that A behaves as the refined arbitration function
on other inputs). Under this arbitration function, player 1 wants to withdraw
as much resources as possible from c1, . . . , ct, but do so in a manner that the
coalitions he keeps intact correspond to a set cover of A.
We observe that A∗(CS ,x, {1}) ≥ 5(t+ 2) + t − ℓ if and only if 〈A,S, ℓ〉 is
a “yes” instance of Set-Cover. First, if there is a subset S ′ ⊆ S such that
|S ′| ≤ ℓ, then by withdrawing from the coalitions corresponding to S \ S ′, and
allocating the withdrawn resources to working alone, player 1 ensures that he
receives a payoff of at least 5(t + 2) + t − ℓ; on the other hand, if there exists
a set of coalitions CS ′ = (cj1 , . . . , cjs) such that withdrawing from CS
′ ensures
that the payoff to player 1 is at least 5(t+ 2) + t− ℓ, then it must be that the
set of coalitions that player 1 chose to withdraw from does not contain d, and
corresponds to a set S ′ ⊆ S such that S \ S ′ is a set cover of A.
Remark 4.3. We contrast Proposition 4.2 with Proposition 3.3: computing
the most that a set can gain with a given set of resources is computationally
much easier than deciding what is the most it stands to gain by deviating. This
issue does not arise in classic cooperative games: a set assesses the desirability
of deviation by considering the most it can make on its own, which only requires
computing v(S).
It seems that the hardness of deciding ArbVal stems from the fact that the
payoff from a coalition c to a deviating set S is determined by the way S affects
other coalitions. In the reduction used in Proposition 4.2, the payoff to player 1
from the coalition d was determined by the deviation from other coalitions. In
other words, the arbitration function determines the payoff to a deviating set S
based on the global behavior of S.
This observation motivates the following definition.
Definition 4.4. An arbitration function A is local if the payoff from a coalition
c depends only on the effect of the deviating set S on c, regardless of the input
to A. In other words, for any game G = 〈N,W, v〉, any outcome (CS ,x), any set
S ⊆ N and any deviation CS ′ of S from CS , the payoff to S from c ∈ CS \CS |S
depends only on d(c), x(c), S, and G.
We note that the conservative, refined and optimistic arbitration functions
are local: the payoff from the the conservative arbitration function is 0 for all
inputs; the payment from the refined arbitration function is x(S) if d(c) = 0n
and is 0 otherwise, and the payment from the optimistic arbitration function
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is max{v(c− d(c))−
∑
i/∈S x(c)
i, 0}. In contrast, the arbitration function used
in the proof of Theorem 4.2 is non-local. Another example of a non-local ar-
bitration function is the sensitive arbitration function, as the payoff to a set
from a coalition c depends on which agents in the support of c were hurt by the
deviation of S from other coalitions.
When one is limited to the class of local arbitration functions, it is indeed
possible to decide ArbVal in time polynomial in |CS | and W
|S|
M , where S is
the deviating set.
Theorem 4.5. ArbVal is decidable in time polynomial in |CS | and W
|S|
M for
all instances 〈G,A, S, (CS ,x), V 〉 such that A is local.
Proof. We first observe that a coalition structure CS has at most (WM + 1)|S|
coalitions that involve players in S. Given a coalition structure CS , let CS ′ be
the set of coalitions that are supported by both S and N \ S; i.e., CS ′ = {c ∈
CS | supp(c) ∩ S 6= ∅; supp(c) ∩ N \ S 6= ∅}. For every c ∈ CS ′, recall that
cS is the coalition c with the coordinates corresponding to members of N \ S
equal to 0; that is, cS is the contributions of S to the coalition c. Now, suppose
that players in S invest s ∈ W(S) units of resources in partial coalitions among
themselves —i.e., w(CS |S) = s— and want to withdraw an additional t ∈ W(S)
from CS . They would get v∗(s + t) from working on their own, plus the most
that S can get from the arbitration function, which depends on the coalitions
affected by this deviation. Thus, in order to determine the most that S can get
by deviating from (CS ,x), given that it must withdraw a total of t resources,
we must determine how to best withdraw those t resources from CS ′. We write
CS ′ = (c1, . . . , cm).
Let us denote by A(t; ℓ) the most that the arbitration function A will give
S if they withdraw t resources from the first ℓ coalitions, where 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ m. We
also write αc(t) to be the payoff to S from the coalition c if S withdraws t from
c. Since agents may not withdraw more resources than they have invested in
a coalition, we set αc(t) = −∞, if t is greater than c in any coordinate. We
note that αc(0
n) is the amount that S receives from c if it does not withdraw
any resources from c. The value αc(0
n) can be any value in R, but the key
observation is that if the coalition c has no resources withdrawn from it, it pays
αc(0
n) to S, regardless of how S affects other coalitions.
By definition, A(t; 1) = αc1(t), for other coalitions we have
A(t; ℓ) = max{A(y; ℓ− 1) + αcℓ(t− y) | 0
n ≤ y ≤ t}.
This shows that we can compute A(t;m) in O(m(WM + 1)|S|) steps. Finally,
A∗(CS ,x, S) can be computed as max{v∗(s+ t)+A(t;m) | 0n ≤ t ≤WS − s},
which concludes the proof.
Coming back now to imposing interaction structures on the cooperation
among agents, we provide an analogous positive result to that in Section 3. In
particular, as is the case for computing an optimal coalition structure for games
where the interaction graph is a tree, computing the most that a set can get by
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deviating can be done in time polynomial in n andWM if the arbitration function
is local and the interaction graph is a tree. In fact, one can see Theorem 4.6 as
an immediate corollary of Theorem 3.6.
Theorem 4.6. ArbVal is decidable in time polynomial in n and WM for all
instances 〈G,A, S(CS ,x), V 〉 such that A is local and such that G is a discrete
2-OCF game with a tree interaction structure.
Proof. Again, we choose an arbitrary r ∈ N to be the root of the interaction
tree. Consider some player i ∈ S; i needs to decide how much weight to allocate
to each non-S neighbor, given the amount that he gives to his parent. Let Di
be the set of non-S neighbors of i, that i gets some payoff from interacting
with, under (CS ,x). Let us denote by αi(w) the most that i can make if he
devotes w to interacting with Di. In order to compute αi(w), we use dynamic
programming. We fix an ordering of Di and let αi(w; j) be the most that player
i can get by keeping a weight of w in the interaction with the first j agents in
Di. We also denote by A∗i (w; j) the payoff to player i if he keeps a weight of w
in the interaction with the j-th player in Di. By Theorem 4.5, A∗i (w; j) can be
computed in time polynomial in WM . Further, we have αi(w; 0) = 0 for all w
and
αi(w; j) = max{αi(x; j − 1) +A
∗
i (w − x; j) | 0 ≤ x ≤ w},
Set
v¯∗i (w) = max{v
∗
i (x) + αi(w − x) | 0 ≤ x ≤ w}.
We now replace player i’s v∗i by v¯
∗
i for the purpose of computing v
∗(S), which is
doable in polynomial time according to Theorem 3.6; this will give us the most
that S can get by deviating under A.
We observe that Theorem 4.6 holds even if the overall interaction graph is not
a tree; it suffices that the deviating set S is an acyclic subgraph of the interaction
graph. This is because in 2-OCF games, interactions can only be between pairs
of players; thus, if an agent i ∈ S decides to withdraw resources from a coalition
c, that coalition can contain at most one other agent j. Therefore, no other agent
in S is concerned with c, i.e., agents in S need to keep individual track of how
much they withdraw from coalitions supported by N \ S, which significantly
simplifies the computational process of deciding where to withdraw resources
from.
5. Computing A-Stable Outcomes
We now turn to a different computational problem. Having provided efficient
procedures for computing optimal deviations and coalition structures in discrete
2-OCF games with tree interaction structures, we are ready to analyze the
computational complexity of stability in this class of games. Recall that an
OCF game is A-stable if there exists some outcome (CS ,x) such that no subset
of N can profitably deviate from (CS ,x), i.e., if for all S ⊆ N we have that
pS(CS ,x) ≥ A
∗(CS ,x, S).
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In this context, we are first interested in the following problem.
Definition 5.1 (CheckCore). An instance of CheckCore is given by a
discrete OCF game G = 〈N,W, v〉, an arbitration function A, and an outcome
(CS ,x); it is a “yes” instance if (CS ,x) is in the A-core of G, and a “no” instance
otherwise.
We are now ready to present an algorithm for checking whether a given
outcome is in the A-core. This problem is closely related to that of computing
A∗: an outcome (CS ,x) is in the A-core if and only if the excess e(CS ,x, S) =
A∗(CS ,x, S) − pS(CS ,x) is non-positive for all coalitions S ⊆ N . Thus, we
need to check whether there exists a subset S ⊆ N with e(CS ,x, S) > 0. Note
that it suffices to limit attention to subsets of N that form connected subgraphs
of the interaction graph of the game: if e(CS ,x, S) > 0 and S is not connected,
then some connected component S′ of S also satisfies e(CS ,x, S′) > 0.
Theorem 5.2. If G is a 2-OCF game with a tree interaction structure, and A
is local, then CheckCore is decidable in time polynomial in n and WM for
any instance 〈G,A, (CS ,x)〉.
Proof. Fixing an outcome (CS ,x), let us write pi := pi(CS ,x) for all i ∈ N .
As in our previous results, we pick an arbitrary r ∈ N as a root. We say that
S ⊆ N is rooted at i ∈ N if i ∈ S and the members of S form a subtree of Ti
- the tree rooted in i. We observe that every set S ⊆ N is rooted at a unique
i ∈ N . Given a vertex i, let Ei denote the maximum excess of a set rooted at
i, that is:
Ei = max {e(CS ,x, S) | S is rooted in Ti} .
Clearly, (CS ,x) is not A-stable if and only if Ei > 0 for some i ∈ N . It remains
to show that all Ei can be computed in time polynomial in n and WM . As
before, we proceed from the leaves to the root, and terminate (and report that
(CS ,x) is not A-stable) if we discover a vertex i with Ei > 0. If Ei ≤ 0 for all
i ∈ N , we report that (CS ,x) is A-stable.
Given two agents i, j ∈ N , let wi,j denote the total weight that i assigns to
interacting with j under CS , i.e.,
wi,j =
∑
c:supp(c)={i,j}
ci.
Observe that since G is a 2-OCF game, it is no loss of generality to assume that
i only invests weight in interacting with j only in coalitions that are supported
by i and j alone. We begin by defining two auxiliary values. First, given a
neighbor j of i, we define αi,j(w) to be the most that A will give i if he keeps a
total weight of w ≤ wi,j in the coalitions that he formed with j in (CS ,x); by
Theorem 4.5,
The value αi,j(w) is computable in time polynomial in WM . Second, we
define Di(w) to be the maximum excess of a subset rooted at i if i were to
contribute w to Ti and nothing to his parent p(i). In this notation,
Ei = max{Di(w) + αi,p(i)(y) | w + y = wi, w ≥ wi − wi,p(i)};
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the condition w ≥ wi − wi,p(i) ensures that p(i) is not among the deviators. It
remains to show how to compute Di(w) in time poly(n,WM ) for all i ∈ N and
w such that wi − wi,p(i) ≤ w ≤ wi.
Consider an agent i with children Ci = {i1, . . . , iℓ}, and suppose that we have
computed Dij (z) for each ij ∈ Ci and each z such that wij − wij ,i ≤ z ≤ wij
(this encompasses the possibility that i is a leaf, as Ci = ∅ in that case). For
j = 0, . . . , ℓ, let Ti,j be the tree obtained from Ti by removing subtrees rooted
at ij+1, . . . , iℓ. Let Di(w; j) be the maximum excess of a set rooted at i that is
fully contained in Ti,j, assuming that i contributes w to Ti,j and nothing to his
parent or his children ij+1, . . . , iℓ; we have Di(w) = Di(w; ℓ). We will compute
Di(w; j) by induction on j.
We have Di(w; 0) = v
∗
i (w)−pi for all w = wi−wi,p(i), . . . , wi. Now, consider
j > 0. Agent i can either include ij in the deviating set or deviate (partially
or fully) from the coalitions that it forms with ij in (CS ,x). Thus, Di(w; j) =
max{D1, D2}, where
D1 = max
y=0,...,w
z=0,...,wij
{Di(y; j − 1) + v
∗
i,ij (w − y, z) +Dj(wij − z)}.
and
D2 = max
z=0,...,wi,ij
{Di(w − z; j − 1) + αi,ij (z)}.
Since both quantities D1 and D2 can be computed in time polynomial in WM ,
we can efficiently compute Di(w; j), and hence also Di(w) and Ei.
Not only can the algorithm described in Theorem 5.2 decide CheckCore
in time polynomial in n and WM , it can also be used to decide the following,
closely related problem. Instead of asking if a given outcome (CS ,x) is A-stable,
we are also interested in deciding whether a given coalition structure CS can
be stabilized, i.e., whether there exists some division of payoffs among agents
in such a way that the resulting outcome is A-stable. This is formalized in the
following definition.
Definition 5.3. An instance of Is-Stable is given by a discrete OCF game
G = 〈N,W, v〉, an arbitration function A and a coalition structure CS .
Given a coalition structure CS = (c1, . . . , cm), an instance of Is-Stable
〈G,A,CS 〉 is a “yes” instance if and only if there exists a payoff division x ∈
I(CS ), x = (x1, . . . ,xm), that satisfies the following system of constraints.∑
i∈supp(cj)
xij = v(cj) ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} (1)
∑
i∈S
m∑
j=1
xij ≥ A
∗(CS ,x, S) ∀S ⊆ N
xij ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}; ∀i ∈ supp(cj)
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The first set of constraints —also called efficiency constraints— ensures that x
is indeed a valid imputation, while the second set of constraints —also called
stability constraints— ensures that (CS ,x) is in the A-core of G. The num-
ber of constraints in (1) is exponential in n; moreover, there is no guarantee
that A∗(CS ,x, S) is a value that is linear in x. However, if the set of con-
straints described in (1) is linear in x, then one can use a simple modification
of the algorithm described in Theorem 5.2 as a separation oracle; given a lin-
ear program with an arbitrary number of constraints, a separation oracle is an
algorithm whose input is a candidate point, and can decide in polynomial time
whether the point satisfies all constraints, and can output a violated constraint
otherwise. Given such an algorithm, one can decide if there exists a point that
satisfies all constraints.
We note that the set of constraints (1) is linear for the conservative, refined,
and optimistic arbitration functions. Thus, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 5.4. Is-Stable is decidable in time polynomial in n and WM for
all instances 〈G,A,CS 〉 such that G is a 2-OCF game with a tree interaction
structure, and A is the conservative, refined or optimistic arbitration function.
Indeed, Corollary 5.4 holds for any arbitration function for which the set of
constraints (1) is linear.
6. Beyond Tree Interactions
In previous sections, we have shown that if the game G is a discrete 2-OCF
game with a tree interaction structure, then most relevant stability notions can
be computed in time polynomial in n, the number of players, and WM , the
maximal weight of any player. We now show how to extend our algorithms to
2-OCF games that have an interaction graph that is not a tree.
If G is a 2-OCF game, then its interaction graph is a simply a graph with
either simple edges or self edges. Moreover, if G is a k-OCF game then its inter-
action graph contains no edges of size≥ k. In this section, we show how our algo-
rithms and their complexity can be parameterized by the treewidth of the game’s
interaction graph. The algorithms we describe assume that H is connected;
however, all our results hold even if H is not connected, by simply applying
our methods to each of the connected components of H separately. We employ
an important graph parameter, called the treewidth (Robertson and Seymour,
1984). Given a graph Γ = 〈N,E〉, a tree decomposition of Γ is a tree T whose
vertices are subsets of N (we write V (T ) to denote the vertices of T and E(T )
to denote its edges), and which satisfies the following three conditions
1. If e ∈ E then there is some vertex S ∈ V (T ) such that e ⊆ S.
2. Given any two vertices S, S′ ∈ V (T ) such that there is some i ∈ N that
is in S ∩ S′, i appears in every vertex on the path between S and S′.
Given a tree decomposition T of H, let us write width(T ) to be max{|S| | S ∈
V (T )} − 1; we define the treewidth of a hypergraph H to be
tw(H)
def
= min{width(T ) | T is a tree decomposition of H}.
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We note that the −1 is simply a normalization factor, which ensures that the
treewith of trees is 1; in fact, a graph is a tree if and only if its treewidth (Robertson and Seymour,
1984) is 1. Given a tree decomposition T , we write N(T )
def
=
⋃
S∈V (T ) S; i.e.
N(T ) is the set of all agents that are in the nodes of T .
We say that a problem is fixed parameter tractable with respect to a param-
eter k if the problem can be decided in time f(k)nc where f is some function
of k and c is a constant independent of k and n. Intuitively, if k is set to a
constant, then the problem can be solved quickly.
Treewidth is often used as a parameter in the parameterized complexity anal-
ysis of graph related combinatorial problems; Courcelle’s theorem (Courcelle,
1990) states that any graph property that can be stated using a fairly standard
set of operators (monadic second order logic) is fixed parameter tractable, with
the treewidth of the graph being the parameter. Treewidth has also been used
in the study of cooperative games, both for studying the computational com-
plexity of finding solution concepts (Greco et al., 2011), and in studying their
structure (Meir et al., 2013).
We now generalize the algorithmic results shown in previous sections to 2-
OCF games whose interaction graphs have a treewidth of k; more specifically, we
provide generalization of Theorems 3.6, 4.6 and 5.2 for games whose interaction
graphs have a treewidth of k. We note that deciding whether an interaction
graph has a treewidth of k (and finding a tree decomposition of the hypergraph
H of width at most k) is fixed parameter tractable in k. Finally, we overload
notation and write tw(G) to be the treewidth of the interaction graph of G,
where G is a discrete 2-OCF game.
Theorem 6.1. OptVal is decidable in time polynomial in n and W
tw(G)+1
M for
all instances 〈G, c, V 〉 such that G is a 2-OCF game.
Proof. We again show how to compute an optimal coalition structure when
all agents invest all their resources; the reduction to a general coalition c is
trivial. Let T be a tree decomposition of the interaction graph of G such that
width(T ) = k. Let us choose some R ∈ V (T ) to be the root of T ; for any
X ∈ V (T ), let us write TX the subtree rooted in the vertex X , p(X) to the
parent of X in T , and CX to be the children of X in T . Intuitively, in order to
compute an optimal coalition structure, agents in X ∩ p(X) need to decide how
much to allocate to their own subtree TX , and how much to allocate to working
with their parent. Let us write opt(TX(q)) to be the value of an optimal coalition
structure over the nodes in TX , but with the agents in X ∩ p(X) investing only
q in working with TX . We observe that
opt(TX(q)) = max
{
v∗(y +
∑
Y ∈CX
xY ) +
∑
Y ∈CY
opt(TY (zY ))
}
,
where zY is the amount that the set X ∩ Y devotes to working with TY , and
xY is what is allocated to working with X ; y is the vector of resources of
X \
⋃
Y ∈CY
Y , assuming that those members of X ∩ p(X) contribute according
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to q, i.e. y = min{q,WX\
⋃
Y∈CY
Y }. Thus, it must hold that y+
∑
Y ∈CY
xY +
zY = min{q,WX}, and xY + zY ≤ min{q,WX∩Y } for all Y ∈ CX .
Taking a similar approach to that used in Theorem 3.6, we employ dynamic
programming in order to compute opt(TX(q)). We write opt(TX(q; j)) to be
the most that TX can make if X ∩ p(X) allocates q to working with TX , and
only the first j children are considered, where CX is set to be {Y1, . . . , Ym}.
TX(q; 0) is simply v∗(min{WX ,q}), and for all j ≥ 1:
opt(TX(q; j)) = max
{
opt(TX(q − z; j − 1) + opt(TYj (z)) | z ≤ min{q,W
X∩Yj}
}
.
To conclude, assuming we have computed opt(TY (z)) for all Y ∈ CX and all z,
we can compute opt(TX(q) in time polynomial in W
tw(G)+1
M and linear in |CX |,
which implies that the total running time of the dynamic program is polynomial
in W
tw(G)
M and linear in n.
A similar approach can be used in order to compute the most that a set can
get by deviating from an arbitrary graph. The same key observation used in
Theorem 4.6 is made here: in order to compute the most that a set S can get
by deviating, we first replace v∗i (w) with v¯
∗
i (w), where v¯
∗
i (w) = max{αi(w −
x) + v∗i (x) | 0 ≤ x ≤ w}, and αi(w) is the most that i can from the arbitration
function if it leaves a total of w of its resources with non-deviators. Having
replaced v∗i with v¯
∗
i we run the algorithm described in Theorem 6.1 to obtain
the following:
Theorem 6.2. ArbVal is decidable in time polynomial in n and W
tw(G)+1
M for
all instances 〈G,A, c, V 〉 such that A is local and G is a 2-OCF game.
Finally, we provide an algorithm for deciding instances of CheckCore that
runs in time polynomial in n and W
tw(G)+1
M .
Theorem 6.3. An instance of CheckCore is decidable in time polynomial in
n and W
tw(G)+1
M for all instances 〈G,A, (CS ,x)〉 such that A is local and G is a
2-OCF game.
Proof. Given an outcome (CS ,x), our goal is to find a subset S ⊆ N such that
e(CS ,x, S) < 0 if such a subset exists. Let T be the tree decomposition of the
interaction graph of G, and we again choose some R ∈ V (T ) to be the root of
T . Take some S ⊆ X ; let us denote by TS the subtree rooted in X ,but with the
members of X \ S removed from all the nodes in TX . We say that a subset T
of N is rooted in TS if T ⊆ N(TS) and S ⊆ T ; that is, T is rooted in TS only
if it contains S, as well as being contained in N(TS). We write ES(q) to be
the excess of the unhappiest subset rooted in S, assuming that S devotes only
q ≤WS to interacting with TS .
Now, suppose that we have already computed ET (z) for all T ⊆ Y where
Y is a child of X and for all z ≤ WY . Let us set CS = {Y1, . . . , Ym}, where
CS = {Y \ (N \ S) | Y ∈ CX}; we write ES(q; j) to be the maximal excess
achievable by any subset rooted in TS , with all resources allocated to the first
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j children of S, and assuming that S allocates q resources to working with
TS . Therefore, ES(q; 0) is e(CS ,x, S,q) = A∗(CS ,x, S,q) − pS(CS ,x), where
A∗(CS ,x, S,q) is the most that S can get by deviating when it has only q
resources to allocate to working with non-deviators and optimize its own payoffs.
Now, when choosing how to deviate with the j-th child, S needs to decide
how much of its resources to allocate to Yj , and which subset of Yj to join into
to the deviation. It has already joined all members of S∩Yj , but it now needs to
choose an additional subset T ⊆ Yj \S to bring into the deviation, and demand
resources from it in an optimal manner; in other words,
ES(q; j) = max
{
ES(q
′; j − 1) + v∗(q− q′ + r) + ET (W
T − r)
}
,
where the maximization is over all q′ ≤ q, all T ⊆ Yj and all r ≤WT .
Thus, we can compute ES(q) in time polynomial in |CX | and (2WM )tw(G),
and therefore decide CheckCore in polynomial time as well.
7. Linear Bottleneck Games and the Optimistic Core
In this section, we deviate from the discrete setting described so far, and
assume that agents have rational weights; this is simply a matter of notational
ease, as all of the definitions of discrete OCF games carry through to the ratio-
nal setting. The main objective of this section is to describe a class of cooper-
ative games with overlapping coalitions that has a non-empty optimistic core,
and instances of OptVal, ArbVal, CheckCore and Is-Stable are decidable
in polynomial time when restricted to this class. Our class of OCF games is
motivated by fractional combinatorial optimization scenarios. In the previous
sections, we make no assumptions on the structure of the characteristic function,
but rather use underlying agent interaction to facilitate poly-time computation.
In what follows, we do not make any assumptions on agent interactions, but
rather restrict our attention to a family of characteristic functions. This ap-
proach can lead to strong results, basically allowing us to efficiently decide any
and all instances of OCF games in this class.
We begin by recalling the notion of stability under the optimistic arbitration
function, which will be notion of stability we study in this section. Given the
optimistic arbittration function, denoted Ao, an Ao-profitable deviation of a set
S ⊆ N from an outcome (CS ,x) can be described by
(a) the list of coalitions CS |S ⊆ CS
′ ⊆ CS that S fully withdraws resources
from. These are coalitions that S does not wish to retain payoffs from, thus
it fully withdraws its resources from them, and utilizes those resources to
maximize its own profits.
(b) the partial deviation of S CS ′′ from CS \CS ′, i.e. the amount of resources
each i ∈ S withdraws from each coalition in CS \ CS ′. The coalitions in
CS ′ are those that S does wish to retain interactions with, and is thus
willing to maintain the payoffs to N \ S in those coalitions, effectively
assuming the marginal cost of its deviation from those coalitions.
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S is then allowed to use the resources which it has withdrawn according to CS ′
and CS ′′ in order to maximize its own profits, while absorbing the damage it
has caused CS \ CS ′ by withdrawing CS ′′. We define a large class of OCF
games that is motivated by combinatorial optimization and resource allocation
scenarios, and prove that these games always have a non-empty optimistic core.
Moreover, we show that for games in this class an optimal coalition structure can
be found using linear programming, and the dual LP solution can be used to find
an imputation in the optimistic core. Our results in this section build on prior
work on classic cooperative game theory, where dual solutions have been used to
derive explicit payoff divisions that guarantee core stability (Deng et al., 1999;
Jain and Mahdian, 2007; Markakis and Saberi, 2005); indeed, one can view our
results as stating that not only are the games described in these works stable
against deviations in the classic cooperative sense (i.e. have a non-empty conser-
vative core), they are also resistant to deviations when much more lenient agent
behavior is assumed. First, let us define the class of games we are interested in.
Definition 7.1. A Linear Bottleneck Game G = (N,ω, T ) is given by a set of
players N = {1, . . . , n}, a list W = (W1, . . . ,Wn) of players’ weights, and a list
of tasks T = (T1, . . . , Tm), where each task Tj is associated with a set of players
Aj ⊆ N who are needed to complete it, as well as a value πj ∈ R+. We assume
that Aj 6= Aj′ for j 6= j′, and for each i ∈ N there is a task Tk ∈ T with
Ak = {i}. The characteristic function of this game is defined as follows: given
a partial coalition c ∈ W , we set
v(c) =
πj · mini∈Aj c
i if supp(c) = Aj for some j ∈ [m]
0 otherwise .
These games are linear in the sense that the payoff earned by a partial
coalition scales linearly with the smallest contribution to this coalition; the
smallest contribution is the “bottleneck” contribution, since the contribution
of no member but the smallest member affects the value of the coalition. The
assumption that Aj 6= Aj′ for j 6= j′ ensures that the characteristic function is
well-defined; that is, each task is associated with a unique set of players that can
complete it. Finally, since each player can work on his own (possibly earning a
payoff of 0), all resources are used. This assumption will be useful when proving
our results, since it allows us to invest unused agent resources in dummy tasks.
7.1. Some Examples
LBGs can be used to describe a variety of settings; a more complete overview
of their descriptive power can be seen in Deng et al. (1999). However, for the
sake of completeness, we provide three examples below. First, LBGs can de-
scribe multicommodity flow games (Vazirani, 2001; Markakis and Saberi, 2005).
Briefly, in multicommodity flow games pairs of vertices in a network want to
send and receive flow, which has to be transmitted by edges of the network.
This setting can be modeled by a linear bottleneck game, where both vertices
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and edges are players. The weight of an edge player is the capacity of his edge,
while the weight of a vertex player is the amount of commodity he possesses.
More formally, there are two types of agents in the multicommodity flow
game: suppliers, denoted Ns, and distributors, denoted Nd. Given a directed
graph Γ with an edge set E(Γ) and a node set V (Γ), each supplier i ∈ Ns
controls a pair of nodes (si, ti), and has certain amount Wi of a commodity,
with a per-unit price of πi. Each distributor j ∈ Nd controls an edge ej , such
that {ej}j∈Nd = E(Γ); each edge has a weight, or capacity, w(e). A task in this
game is to transfer a certain amount of a commodity owned by i from si to ti.
In this setting, each path from si to ti is a task, with its associated set being
the distributors on the path, and the supplier controlling (si, ti); the value of a
coalition is the amount of the commodity supplied by i that the path transfers,
times the per-unit value of that commodity. We note that in this description, the
number of possible tasks may be exponential in the number of agents, however,
as discussed in (Markakis and Saberi, 2005), there do exist other, more succinct,
ways of describing the problem that result in the same solution, and to which our
techniques can be applied. We do maintain the current description, as it does
highlight the fact that multicommodity flow games are indeed linear bottleneck
games.
Another example of a linear bottleneck game occurs in network routing set-
tings. Consider again a directed graph Γ with an edge set E(Γ) and a node set
V (Γ). Here, agents are nodes, and each node i has a certain weight Wi (this
can be thought of as processing power, or amount of memory). Now, the tasks
in this setting are to transfer data from certain source nodes to certain target
nodes, with each such (sj , tj) pair associated with a per-unit payoff πj . Unlike
multicommodity flow games, the amount of data to be transferred is unlimited,
with the only limitation on transfer power stemming from agents’ own capacity
constraints.
Finally, consider a bipartite graph with the node sets A,B, such that A∩B =
∅, and with no edges among the members of A or the members of B. Agents
are nodes, and for every a ∈ A and b ∈ B, the edge e = {a, b} has a certain
value πe. Each agent i ∈ A ∪B has a weight Wi. The tasks here are the edges,
with the member nodes of each edge being the set required to complete the
task, and the payoff being πe. This setting can be thought of as a slightly more
generalized fractional weighted matching game, or, alternatively, as a trading
market, where A is a set of sellers and B is a set of buyers. Having a ∈ A and
b ∈ B form a coalition means that b agrees to buy from a for the set price of
πe per unit. The total value of the coalition structure can be thought of as the
total volume of exchanges made in the trading market.
7.2. Computing Stable Outcomes in LBGs
Before we proceed, let us make some simple observations on the structure of
optimal coalition structures in LBGs.
Lemma 7.2. Given an LBG G = 〈N,W, T 〉, there is some optimal coalition
structure CS such that
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(a) for all c ∈ CS we have ci = cj for all i, j ∈ supp(c).
(b) wi(CS ) =Wi for all i ∈ N .
(c) each Aj forms at most one coalition in CS.
Proof. First, note that given an optimal coalition structure CS for a linear
bottleneck game, we can assume without loss of generality that for every c in
CS and every i, k ∈ Aj we have c
iωi = ckωk: investing more weight than one’s
team members does not increase the payoff from the task, so a player might
as well use this weight to work alone. Second, since we assume that there is a
task that an agent can complete alone, the value of a coalition structure can
only increase when agents invest any unused weight in working alone. Finally,
it can be assumed that CS contains at most one coalition c with supp(c) = Aj
for each j = 1, . . . ,m: if supp(c) = supp(d) = Aj , then v(c+ d) ≥ v(c) + v(d),
so two coalitions with the same support can be merged. This implies that we
can assume that in an optimal coalition structure each Aj forms at most one
coalition cj .
Lemma 7.2 implies that an optimal coalition structure can be described by
a list C1, . . . Cm, indicating how much weight is allocated to each task.
We can now write a linear program that finds an optimal coalition structure
for an LBG G = 〈N,W, T 〉:
max:
∑m
j=1 cjπj (2)
s.t.
∑
j:i∈Aj
cj ≤Wi ∀i ∈ N
cj ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ [m]
The dual of LP (2) is
min:
∑n
i=1Wiγi (3)
s.t.
∑
i∈Aj
γi ≥ πj ∀j ∈ [m]
γi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N
Let ĉ1, . . . , ĉm and γ̂1, . . . , γ̂n be optimal solutions to (2) and (3) respectively.
Let CS be the coalition structure that corresponds to ĉ1, . . . , ĉm. We construct
a payoff vector x for CS as follows: for every j = 1, . . . ,m we set xij = γ̂iĉj , if i ∈
Aj , and x
i
j = 0 otherwise. In words, each player i has some “bargaining power”
γ̂i, and is paid for each task he works on in proportion to his bargaining power.
Note that both CS and x can be computed efficiently from the description of
the game. We will now show that x is an imputation for CS , and, moreover,
(CS ,x) is in the optimistic core.
Theorem 7.3. Let G = 〈N,W, T 〉 be a linear bottleneck game, and let CS
and x be the coalition structure and the payoff vector constructed above. Then
x ∈ I(CS ) and (CS ,x) is in the optimistic core of G.
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Proof. First, we argue that x ∈ I(CS ). To see that x satisfies coalitional effi-
ciency, note that the sum of payoffs from task Tj is∑
i∈Aj
xij =
∑
i∈Aj
γ̂iĉj
= ĉj
∑
i∈Aj
γ̂i
As γ̂1, . . . , γ̂n is an optimal solution to (3), we have either
∑
i∈Aj
γ̂i = πj or
ĉj = 0 (by complementary slackness). Thus, for any task Tj that is actually
executed (i.e., ĉj > 0), its total payoff πj ĉj is shared only by players in Aj .
We now show that the outcome (CS ,x) is in the optimistic core. We can
assume without loss of generality that CS allocates non-zero weight to the first
k tasks T1, . . . , Tk and no weight to the rest (k ≤ m). Consider a deviation from
(CS ,x) by a set S. This deviation can be described by a list of tasks that S
abandons completely, and the amount of weight that players in S withdraw from
all other tasks. Assume without loss of generality that the tasks that S abandons
completely are Tℓ+1, . . . , Tk (this list includes all tasks Tj with Aj ⊆ S), and for
each j = 1, . . . , ℓ each member of Aj ∩ S withdraws zj units of weight from Tj .
Observe that “non-uniform” deviations are no better than “uniform” ones, i.e.
if one agent withdraws more weight from a coalition than the rest in an optimal
deviation, then the rest may as well withdraw the same weight.
When players in S deviate, they lose their payoff from Tℓ+1, . . . , Tk, and
their payoff from T1, . . . , Tℓ is reduced by
∑ℓ
j=1 zjπj .
For each i ∈ S, set νi =
∑
ℓ<j≤k,i∈Aj
ĉj , Zi =
∑
j≤ℓ,i∈Aj
zj : νi is the
total amount of weight that i withdraws from tasks Tℓ+1, . . . , Tk while Zi is
the total amount that i withdraws from T1, . . . , Tℓ. The profit that S obtains
from optimally using the withdrawn resources is given by the following linear
program:
max:
∑
Aj⊆S
cjπj (4)
s.t.
∑
j:i∈Aj ,Aj⊆S
cj ≤ νi + Zi ∀i ∈ S
The dual of LP (4) is
min:
∑
i∈S γi(νi + Zi) (5)
s.t.
∑
i∈Aj
γi ≥ πj ∀Aj ⊆ S
Let α be the value of (4) (and hence also of (5)). Note that the total profit
that S gets by deviating equals α −
∑ℓ
j=1 zjπj , where
∑ℓ
j=1 zjπj is the total
marginal loss incurred by S partially deviating from T1, . . . , Tℓ. Any optimal
solution to (3) is a feasible solution to (5) (when looking at the restriction of
the solution to those members of i); the constraints in (3) are more restricted
than those in (5), since νi + Zi ≤ Wi for all i ∈ S. Hence, given the optimal
solution of the Dual (3) restricted to S, (γ̂i)i∈S , we have that
α ≤
∑
i∈S
γ̂i(νi + Zi).
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Now,
∑
i∈S γ̂
iνi is exactly the payoff that S was getting from Tℓ+1, . . . , Tk
under (CS ,x). Further,
∑
i∈S
γ̂iZi =
ℓ∑
j=1
∑
i∈S∩Aj
γ̂izj
=
ℓ∑
j=1
zj
 ∑
i∈S∩Aj
γ̂i
 ≤ ℓ∑
j=1
zj
∑
i∈Aj
γ̂i
 ≤ ℓ∑
j=1
zjπj
where the last inequality holds as per the constraints in (3); as previously men-
tioned, the latter expression is the marginal loss that S pays for withdrawing
resources from T1, . . . , Tℓ. Thus, the total payoff that S gets from deviating is
at most
∑
i∈S γ̂iνi; but:∑
i∈S
γ̂iνi =
∑
i∈S
γ̂i
∑
ℓ<j≤k,i∈Aj
ĉj
≤
∑
i∈S
γ̂i
∑
j:i∈Aj
ĉj
=
∑
i∈S
pi(CS ,x) = pS(CS ,x)
To conclude, the total payoff S receives from deviating under the optimistic
arbitration function does not exceed its payoff in (CS ,x). As this holds for any
deviation and any S, (CS ,x) is in the optimistic core.
Finding an optimal solution for a linear program and its dual can be done
in polynomial time; therefore, we obtain the following immediate corollary.
Corollary 7.4. Given an LBG G = 〈N,W, T 〉, OptVal, ArbVal, and CheckCore
can be decided in polynomial time under the optimistic arbitration function.
Moreover, since we know that the optimistic core is not empty for LBGs, it
is in particular not empty for the conservative, sensitive and refined arbitration
functions.
8. Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we analyzed computational aspects of finding optimal coalition
structures and stable outcomes in OCF games. The first part of our work
assumed a certain structure on agent interaction: agents were only allowed to
form small-sized coalitions, and computational efficiency was highly dependent
on a tree-like interaction graph. In the latter part of this work, we assumed
that agent interaction was not limited, but restricted ourselves to a class of
characteristic functions.
Using structural limitations as a method for ensuring tractability is interest-
ing, but it forces us to make strong assumptions on the way agents interact; one
29
could argue that the assumptions we require are rather unrealistic. Apart from
their intrinsic interest, we believe that our results show how hard it is to effi-
ciently compute core allocations in OCF games when one makes no assumptions
on the characteristic function.
We believe that results in the spirit of Section 7 would prove to be more
instructive; that is, finding classes of OCF games that can be stabilized with
respect to certain arbitration functions would prove to be useful.
Arbitration functions naturally encode agent behavior towards one another;
more lenient reactions to deviation signify agents that are more tolerant towards
each other. This tolerance may arise due to agents being completely myopic in
their behavior —as is captured by the idea of a local arbitration function—
and is an important assumption in deciding the computational complexity of
stability related problems in OCF games. We believe that non-myopic reaction
to deviation (e.g. the sensitive arbitration function) would severely hinder poly-
time computability. It would be interesting to identify a meaningful class of OCF
games for which computing a core allocation is possible in polynomial time if
the arbitration function is local, but is not when the arbitration function is more
complex. Even results related to, say, the refined and the sensitive core would
be interesting. We mention that linear bottleneck games are not appropriate
for this type of analysis; since the optimistic core of these games is not empty
(and an optimistic core outcome can be found in polynomial time), an outcome
in the sensitive core can trivially be found (simply pick the outcome computed
for the optimistic core), as the optimistic core is contained in the sensitive core.
8.1. Related Work
Our work expands and builds upon two previous papers on OCF games.
The first is the seminal work by Chalkiadakis et al. (2010), and the second is a
recently published paper by Zick et al. (2014). Chalkiadakis et al. (2010) define
the OCF model and discuss some initial computational results; for example,
they show that it is possible to find an outcome in the conservative core of
threshold task games if agent weights are not too large; they also show that
finding an outcome in the refined core is computationally harder than finding
an outcome in the conservative core. This is the first indication that different
arbitration functions not only lead to different outcomes, but can also raise
computational barriers. While Zick et al. (2014) do not study computational
aspects of OCF games, their work does present us with some possibly useful
tools in the computational analysis of OCF games. First, Zick et al. (2014) show
that certain classes of OCF games are guaranteed to have a non-empty core;
however, their proofs rely on balancedness conditions, and are not computational
in nature. Thus, even though some games are guaranteed to be stable with
respect to some arbitration functions, computing stable outcomes may be hard.
Many works focus on computing optimal coalition structures in cooperative
games. The optimal coalition structure generation problem has received plenty
of attention in classic cooperative game theory literature (see Sandholm et al.
(1999); Larson and Sandholm (2000); Michalak et al. (2008); Rahwan et al. (2009,
2012), as well as the overview chapters in (Chalkiadakis et al., 2011; Weiss,
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2013)). Some authors have studied games with overlapping coalitions as well.
We mention the seminal work by Shehory and Kraus (1996), as well as the work
by Lin and Hu (2007) and Zhang et al. (2010). While these works are highly
related to ours, their methodology and objectives are different. We are not only
interested in forming an optimal coalition structure, but also in stable revenue
division.
Computational aspects of classic cooperative games have been an object of
extensive study. Preliminary computational results can be attributed to the
founders of the field; Mann and Shapley (1960) and Mann and Shapley (1962)
study methods to compute the Shapley value Shapley (1953) (an important
solution concept in cooperative game theory) using exact methods and via ap-
proximation. Their results, while not phrased in the language of modern com-
putational complexity, are of a computational nature. The seminal paper by
Deng and Papadimitriou (1994) was the precursor of several works on the sub-
ject. A non-comprehensive list includes Deng et al. (1999); Ieong and Shoham
(2005); Matsui and Matsui (2000); Elkind et al. (2007); Greco et al. (2011); see
the survey in Chalkiadakis et al. (2011). The methods used by Brafman et al.
(2010) are quite similar to ours, and echo the ideas of Demange (2004), in ex-
ploiting the tree structure of games for computational purposes. Finally, we
mention some recent works on stability in OCF environments. Zhang et al.
(2013) employ the OCF model in analyzing wireless networks, and show some
stability results in this setting; Ackerman and Braˆnzei (2012) study a pairwise
collaboration model that is similar to the OCF model studied here. Their paper
studies pairwise equilibria in this model, rather than stability.
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